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ABSTRACT
At this point there are many papers discussing how the Great Depression
of the 21st century came to be, its causes and the things that need to be
changed in the world's financial market in order to overcome and prevent
it from happening again. We would like to contribute to the debate by
sharing some of the experiences we had in our own country that may shed
some light on how it really affected developing countries, especially Brazil.
This is the main purpose of the present paper, to discuss how the sub-prime
international crisis affected the Brazilian economy, the counter-cyclical
measurements the Government took, and how the country has reacted thus
fa r.
Key words: Financial Crisis, Brazil, Latin America, Legal Measures,
Recovery.
1. INTRODUCTIONA Tthis point, there are many papers discussing how the Great
Depression of the 21st century came to be, its causes, and the
changes needed in the world's financial market to overcome and
prevent it from happening again. We would like to contribute to the de-
bate by sharing some experiences from our own country, Brazil, that may
shed some light on how the crisis really affected developing countries..
The main purpose of this paper is to discuss how the sub-prime interna-
tional crisis affected the Brazilian economy, the counter-cyclical measure-
ments taken by the government, and the country's reaction thus far.
In order to better contextualize Brazil's situation, we will follow the
international expectations for the crisis crystallized at the United Nations
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Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact
on Development.' We adopt this approach not because we believe that
these expectations are necessarily the best method for studying the crisis
in any specific country, but because they adequately represent expecta-
tions of the broader international community on what should be antici-
pated in general from the crisis.
In the first part of this paper, we review each of the possible identifi-
able effects of the crisis on different countries and discuss whether it re-
ally happened in or affected Brazil. We will also discuss why such effects
occurred and try to associate specific policies implemented by the Brazil-
ian Government connected with those effects. In the second part, we
evaluate Brazil's current economic situation and its standing in the world
post-crisis. Finally, we present some conclusions regarding Brazil's future
challenges.
1I. INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND THE BRAZILIAN
ECONOMY DURING THE CRISIS
Beginning in 2007, an unexpected economic crisis swept around the
globe. Beginning with the sub-prime financial market in the United
States, the crisis gradually spread through the rest of the American finan-
cial market, contaminating its productive economy and dragging most
countries in the world down with it. There is still some debate on
whether the crisis was created by a lack of regulation, excessive regula-
tion, or simply the failure to establish adequate public policies in a frus-
trated attempt to provide houses for those who could not afford them.
But most scholars and authorities would agree that the crisis is probably
rooted in inadequate regulations, speculative rational individual risk as-
sessments that made no sense systematically, or both combined with
clearly unsound banking and financial practices. 2
Independent of its origins, the truth is that the crisis hit the U.S. econ-
omy hard. Until then, the United States had the most important econ-
omy in the world and its failure quickly contaminated other countries-
rich, poor, and developing. When the crisis began, many closed econo-
mies like Brazil were relatively less affected by the crisis, and some even
1. Outcome of the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its
Impact on Development, G.A. Res. 63/3 03, at 4, U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 95th plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc AIRES16311351 (July 13, 2009) [hereinafter U.N. Conference].
2. For example, the G-20 publicly assumed that the causes of the current financial crisis
are rooted in inadequate appreciation of the risks taken in an economic expansion
period, failure to exercise proper duie diligence, and "weak underwriting standards,
unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and opaque financial
products, and consequent excessive leverage. " In addition, "[plolicy-makers, regui-
lators and supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate
and address the risks building uip in financial markets, keep pace with financial in-
novation, or take into account the systemic ramifications of domestic regulatory ac-
tions. " Other findamental factors were "inconsistent and insufficiently coordinated
macroeconomic policies, inadequate structural reforms[.]" G20 Declaration: Full
text Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, BBC NEWS, Nov. 15,
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7731741.stm.
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ventured to talk not only about a decoupling effect but also about a re-
verse-coupling effect.3 According to this hypothesis, rising economies
like China would become the locomotive that would drag the rich coun-
tries back from their economic black hole. This line of argument has now
been largely abandoned. Instead, the crisis hit almost everyone, and what
a hit it was! Still, notwithstanding the fact that it destroyed richness
equivalent to one year of work of the whole world, the crisis has not ri-
valed in any aspect the chaos generated by the Great Depression of the
20th century. Many economies faced recession but very few, if any, fell
into complete disarray.
In fact, the crisis has not affected every country in the same manner or
with the same intensity. Some countries did suffer greatly while others
were affected less. So far, Brazil is unmistakably in the second group.4 In
general, rich countries (mostly the United States and European coun-
tries) seem to have endured the most devastating effects of the crisis.5
Because the crisis had financial roots, most of the countervailing mea-
sures were financial-such as assisting and financing banks with confi-
dence and cash-flow issues by restructuring their debts and buying toxic
assets from those overexposed to them. By providing liquidity and a
bailout assurance, the general goal was to prevent a credibility crisis and
the feared downfall of the whole financial market.6 Gradually, this strat-
egy seems to have worked, but the effects of the crisis will be long felt
and the future fiscal costs of the bailouts are unclear.
For Latin America, the main problem with the crisis was that it affected
foreign demand for its products and services, while drastically reducing
the excess international liquidity that financed a substantial part of the
investments and expansion of those markets in the previous years.7 The
same excess liquidity was responsible for the general valuation of stock
markets in those economies. In addition, once the insecurity associated
with the crisis was installed, the natural flow of capital from these emerg-
3. Although, as soon as November 2007, the President of the Brazilian Central Bank
was already stating that no country, including Brazil, was immune to an interna-
tional crisis, even though it was much more prepared to face this specific crisis than
the previous ones. See Toni Sciarretta, Brazil is not Imnmune to the Crisis, says
Meirelles, FOLHAONLINE, Nov. 12. 2009, http://wwwl.folha.uoI.com.br/folha/
dinheiro/ult9lu347977.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
4. Marcos Valadao & Nara Galeb Porto, Brazilian Response to International Financial
Crisis, the Pre-Salt Discoveries by Petrobras and the New Free Trade Areas in the
Cities of Brazil, 15 LAw & Bus. REV. Am. 673, 674 (2009).
5. Id. at 674.
6. Id.
7. Addressing the LA situation the ECLA C-UN report stated that: "As a result of the
global economic crisis, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are faced
with a marked fall in external demiand for their goods and services exports and, with
the exception of some Central American and Caribbean countries, with deteriorating
terms of trade. Access to international financing is increasingly difficult to obtain,
and currency markets are coming under strong pressure from capital outflows.'"
U.N. ECLAC, The Reactions of Latin American and Caribbean Governments to the
International Crisis: A n Overview of Policy Measures uip to 30 Jan uary 2009, at 3,
available at h tp://www.eclIac. cI/no ticias/n oticias/ 1/3499 1/2009-I 6-Thle-re act ion of_
LAC-.governments..WEB.pdf.
2010] 5
56 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16
ing economies to supposedly safer harbors put extra pressure on their
balance of payments. All of that, combined with a sudden drop of com-
modities' international prices, announced a bleak future for those
countries.8
As a result, the United Nations General Assembly recognized that:
"[tihe crisis has produced or exacerbated serious, wide-ranging yet
differentiated impacts across the globe. Since the crisis began, many
States have reported negative impacts, which vary by country, re-
gion, level of development and severity, including the following (i)
rapid increases in unemployment, poverty[,] and hunger; (ii) deceler-
ation of growth, economic contraction; (iii) negative effects on trade
balances and balance of payments; (iv) dwindling levels of foreign
direct investment; (v) large and volatile movements in exchange
rates; (vi) growing budget deficits, falling tax revenues and reduction
of fiscal space; (viii) contraction of world trade; (ix) increased volatil-
ity and falling prices for primary commodities; (x) declining remit-
tances to developing countries; (xi) sharply reduced revenues from
tourism; (xii) massive reversal of private capital inflows; (xiii) re-
duced access to credit and trade financing; (xiv) reduced public con-
fidence in financial institutions; (xv) reduced ability to maintain
social safety nets and provide other social services, such as health
and education; (xvi) increased infant and maternal mortality; and
(xvii) collapse of housing markets."
Notwithstanding this undisputedly dreary scenario, until now most of
these effects did not occur in Brazil. If they did, they occurred at a much
lower intensity than expected. Brazil's resistance to the crisis, and its
swiftness in leaving it, is somewhat remarkable for a country known for
constantly living in crisis. We discuss at this point the expected impact of
the crisis on Brazil and its real effect on the country.
A. UNEMPLOYMENT, POVERTY AND HUNGER
The first effects felt in countries associated with the crisis were the in-
crease in unemployment, poverty, and hunger.' 0 It is always important to
stress that about half of the Brazilian economy is conducted under
shadow markets-nformal channels like non-personified businesses. But
because the formal and informal sectors are intrinsically interconnected,
the formal rate of employment is a good proxy for the actual employment
rate, which would be at least equal to the formal rate.
As we can see from Table 1, the unemployment rate in Brazil varies
substantially across the years but has decreased in the last three years, a
trend that is consistent with the rest of the Latin American region. In
fact, as a late comer to the crisis, the unemployment rate in 2008 was
substantially lower than in 2007. when the crisis started. Actually. during
8. Id.
9. U.N. Conference, supra note 1, at 3.
10. Id.
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the crisis the rate reached its lowest value (6.9%) in six years. We can
also see that when the crisis finally hit Brazil at the end of 2008, there was
a sharp increase in the unemployment rate, but by March 2009, it had
resumed its descendent tendency.








3 0E ' P -E; 3 ig
Source: IBGE/PME
Most importantly, the current unemployment rate is still below the pre-
crisis levels, which indicates that although the crisis may have disturbed
the historical descendent tendency, it has not yet reversed it. As a result,
there is no sign of a rapid increase in unemployment in Brazil.
Additionally, because unemployment rates are not increasing, the in-
come of the lowest-income workers should not be substantially affected.
As Table 2 indicates, there is a historical trend in Brazil of an increase in
the real wages workers receive, and the crisis has not affected this trend
until now. Therefore, we expect the pattern of the last ten years to con-
tinue and do not expect increased poverty to be an issue in Brazil. Note
that real income has increased in 2008 for all social classes in a propor-
tional manner, and the income distribution has gradually improved since
2004. We all hope that the crisis does not interrupt this most welcome
trend.
The combination of steady or decreasing unemployment rates and in-
creasing real salaries do not lead to any expectation ot rapid increases of
hunger, although the challenge to maintain the growth pace without the
global bonanza and the income increment with better distribution is a
difficult puzzle to be solved.
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B. GROWTH DECELERATION AND POTENTIAL
ECONOMIC CONTRACTION
It took so long for Brazil to display the impacts of the crisis that some
considered it to be evidence of a decoupling effect while others hoped for
a reverse-coupling effect. Although Brazilian resilience to the crisis
proved strong, there were clear signs of substantial harm to growth and
some questions about the future. Most commentators would agree that
the financing model based on foreign capital will have to be tipped off to
a domestic demand one, a historical challenge for Brazilian
Governments.
As we can see from Table 3, since the Real Plan was introduced in
1994-a date that normally works as a benchmark for policy evaluation-
Brazil's economy appeared to have taken off a number of times. But
growth was repeatedly interrupted by external shocks like the Tequila
Effect in 1994 (Mexico's reserve crisis), the Asian financial crisis in 1997
combined with the subsequent Vodka Effect in 1998 (the Russian's ruble
crisis) that ended up with the Real abrupt devaluation in 1999 (the so
called Samba Effect), followed by the Tango Effect in 2001 (Argentina's
default crisis).'" All of these events affected international capital flows
1I. The State of the World's Cities 2004/2005: Globalization and Urban Culture 17
(United Nations Settlements Programme, 2004).
>
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and raised doubts about other developing countries, severely affecting
Brazil. Brazilians began referring to this pattern of taking off and sudden
landing as "chicken fly growth."
Unfortunately, growth has been dramatically affected by the current
crisis and it seems that history may have just repeated itself in 2009. Bra-
zilian GDP growth in 2009 is expected to be zero or close to zero (either
lightly negative or positive). In other words, we may be experiencing just
another chicken fly. The good news is that just like in the other interna-
tional crisis, Brazil is quickly recovering, and the expected GDP for 2010
may surpass five percent.' 2
Although the Brazilian economy grew more than five percent in real
terms in 2008, in the last quarter it faced a substantial economic contrac-
tion, caused primarily by a sudden drop in the industrial sector that fore-
saw a substantial decrease in the world's demand for its products. Even
with a slighter intensity, contraction repeated itself in the first quarter of
2009 indicating that Brazil was technically in economic recession. The
contraction was substantial and cannot be easily dismissed as just a bump.
12. Michael Mussa, Global Economic Prospects as of September 2009: Onward to
Global Recover-y (Sept. 17, 2009) (on file with the Peter G. Peterson Institute for
International Economics), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/
mussa09O9.pdf.
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TABLE 4: QUARTERLY GDP VARIATION
(SEASONALLY ADJUSTED)
Economic Sector 2008.11 2008.111 2008.1V 2009.1 2009.11
Agriculture 4,2 -)1,5 -)2,0 ()1,4 H- 0,1
Industry 1,1 1,6 ()8,0 ()3,2 2,1
Services 0,6 1,0 ()0,5 0,6 1,2
GDP at market prices 1,5 1,3 -)3,4 -)1,0 1,9*
Source: IBGE 13 . *Preliminary numbers
If, on one hand, it is clear that Brazil faced recession and all decoupling
theories have been dispelled, then the preliminary numbers from 2009's
second quarter may indicate that a quick recovery is imminent. If the
numbers repeat themselves, Brazil may resume its growth path unexpect-
edly faster in 2010. Obviously, this is highly dependent on world recovery
because another bump in the United States or another trading partners'
economy could take Brazil down again.
In any case, Brazil is in a much stronger position to face a world reces-
sion now than in the previous years. According to the Central Bank,
even after the crisis' first wave, the foreign reserves amounted to more
than US$223 billion, 14 and the public debt nominated in dollar has been
largely eliminated. This means that for the first time in the past few de-
cades, Brazil actually has some leeway to implement counter-cyclical poli-
cies-discussed further in Item 0-that could actually alleviate the short-
term impact of the crisis.
In short, Brazil was smacked right in the jaw by the international crisis,
but prior fights taught us to take a punch without hitting the floor. The
blow was quickly absorbed and an adequate response was implemented.
The degree to which we will be able to recover depends not only on the
recovery of the world economy, including commodity price levels, but
also (and maybe more importantly) on the next government's ability to
carry-out the necessary micro-reforms previously unchanged, as we move
to more of an internal demand model of financing growth.
C. TRADE BALANCE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Temost obvious effect of the crisis occurred in the trade balances due
to the eminent economic contraction of the developed countries and the
decreased imports by these countries that would provoke a contraction of
world trade. For this reason, countries that could find room to push inter-
nal markets in order to tackle the crisis would have to adopt this strategy.
13. Quarterlv National Accounts. GDP Falls 0.8% from Q4 2008 to QI 2009 in
Seasonally Adjusted Series, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE),
June 9, 2009, http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/presidencia/noticias/noticia-visualiza.
php?id-noticia=1384&id-pagina 1.
14. Concept of International Liquidity, Brazilian Central Bank, http://www4.bcb.gov.
br/?RP20090928, [hereinafter BACEN].
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The trade balance may be a topic of concern for Brazilian authorities,
but not the most pressing one. It is clear from the table below that trade
flows were highly affected in the beginning of 2008 and 2009, when the
flow was negative for the first time in years. The trade balance also
threatened a quick recovery in 2009, but the number's volatility does not
allow us to make any predictions except that the balance will not be as
positive in 2009 as it was in the previous years. This single fact may put
some pressure in a country that has historically financed its public debt
with export dollars, but the positive inflow of FDI (see Item 2.4 below)
coupled with the growing foreign reserve (see Item 2.2 above) has largely
mitigated this concern.
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Brazil has enjoyed a positive trade balance with the rest of the world in
the last few years-to a large extent due to the substantial increase in com-
modities prices. We say "to a large extent" because commodities are a
very important element of Brazilian export portfolio, making up forty-
eight percent while the world average is at twenty-six percent. Brazil's
portfolio, however, is more diversified than other commodities special-
ized countries like Argentina (sixty-eight percent), Australia (sixty-two
percent), or Russia (seventy-one percent).' 5 But, the crisis seems to have
affected this distribution at least temporarily. The basic products share
within Brazilian export portfolio increased from thirty-five to forty-two
percent in the first six months of 2009, while the manufactured products
15. Fernando Puga, The Specialization of Brazil in Map of World Exports, ECONOMis-r
SAE, Sept. 10, 2007, available at http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/
default/bndes-pt/Galerias/Arquivosconhecimento/visaolvisao936.pdf.
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share fell from forty-eight percent to forty-three percent in the same pe-
riod. Although some have argued that this was a potentially dangerous
movement to export commodities dependence, but note the difference in
the elasticity of commodities and industrialized products markets, com-
bined with the fact that Brazil's greatest commodity client, China, is do-
ing well, while most industrialized products buyers, like the United States
and the rest of Latin America, are not doing so well.
Aware of these happenings, the government Is working to tackle the
emerging threat; though worldwide competitiveness is an issue highly dis-
cussed, it has rarely been worked on. In any case, it is clear that Brazil
has generally enjoyed a positive trade balance in the last few years. Still,
that balance dramatically shifted during the beginning of the crisis and
just after its climax from 2008 to 2009. We can also see that a quick re-
covery may be on the way, but this recovery is unwarranted and will be
somewhat dependent on the performance of Brazilian trading partners
and their own ability to recover from the crisis. All the above mentioned
facts, combined with a large foreign currency stock available at the
BACEN, indicate that the trade balance may be still an issue for long-
term growth. But since the balance was positive in 2008 and looks to
remain so in 2009, all these facts may indicate that the bump did not re-
present a trend chanige.' 6
D. DWINDLING LEVELS OF FOREIGN DIRECTr JNVESTMENT-FDI
Anyone who observed Ibovespa's sharp decline from May to Septem-
ber 2008, when it reached its historical peak only to lose more than sixty
percent of its value, will have to agree that the market did not believe
that Brazil was immune to the crisis. In addition, it is tempting to affirm
that there was a major capital exodus from Brazilian stock market as the
crisis reached its climax. As wearisome as the situation may look, the
actual results for FDI were not so substantial or clear-cut.
Indeed, Brazil initially suffered from a reduction in its FDI inflow as
the crisis showed its amplitude in 2008 and 2009. But the stock market's
behavior does not seem to have been motivated by fundamentals. As a
matter of fact, in May, foreign direct investment in the productive sector
totaled US$2.483 billion-which is the highest result ever recorded by the
Central Bank for May in more than sixty years of monitoring.' 7 Al-
though the authorities expect a lower result for the following months,
there are clear signs that FDI inflow is going to be substantially positive
in 2009 (US$25 billion). Some private analysts estimate the FDI results
for the year as the third highest in the decade, only lower than in 2007
and 2008 when the volume of funds was recorded. As it seems, the ma-
jority reaction in 2008 only created great business opportunities for those
investors that were quick and brave enough to take advantage of it.
16. See BACEN, http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/indeco/ingl/ie5-Oti.xls, supra note 14.
17. Id.
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The Brazilian economy's lesser exposure to the international crisis was
largely due to its low foreign debt nominated in dollars; thus the volatility
of the international market had a reduced impact on public finance. As
recognized by some analysts, the variation of Brazilian international pay-
ment flow is much more connected with changes in its industry's business
cycle vis-a-vis the rest of the world than to its need of external financ-
ing.' 8 As previously mentioned, Brazil's substantial influx of FDI inflow
has contributed to maintaining the international reserves above US$200
billion (about thirteen percent of GDP).
As discredited as rating agencies are after the crisis, it is interesting to
note that Moody's rating agency announced in September that Brazil has
achieved Investment Grade category.' 9 Now the three most relevant rat-
ing agencies classify Brazilian Treasury bonds as investment grade, and
this may reinforce the positive flow of FDI to the country.20
18. A change in the composition of Brazil's foreign liabilities-a phenomenon that pre-
dates the global crisis-is affecting the country's international payment flows. A sus-
tained fall in foreign indebtedness has led to a gradual decline in interest payments[.]
At the same time, increased attractiveness to foreign direct investment since
macroeconomic stabilization in the 1990s, initially motivated by the government's
large privatization programme, has led to an increase in profit and dividend remit-
tances. Rising overall service payments can be attributed to the greater openness to
trade and investment. As a result, because profit and dividend flows are much more
sensitive to the business cycle than interest payments on debt, Brazil's current ac-
count is becoming increasingly sensitive to the business cycle and the difference be-
tween domestic and global cyclical positions. OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil
2009, OECD, 2009, at 24-6, available at http://www.fazenda.gov.br/audiol2009/
julho/OECDBrazil_09.pdf.
19. Moody's Raises Brazil's Ratings to Investment Grade, WALL Sr. J., Sept. 22, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20090922-711270.html.
20. Brazil Becomes Investment Grade by Moody's, TesouroNacional, http://www.
tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/english/hp/downloads/NotaInvestmentGrade.pdf.
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E. LARGE AND VOLATILE MOVEMENTS IN EXCHANGE RATES
As we can see, from July 2008 to July 2009, the Brazilian Real exchange
rate behavior resembles a rollercoaster. The table below shows that the
appreciation tendency over the last three years was abruptly interrupted
in July 2008, only to resume its course a few months later. Note that the
higher volatility period largely coincides with the bear market at
Ibovespa (see Table 6 above).
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Curiously, some have argued that the recent appreciation of the Real
before the dollar has also been a deteriorating element for the balance of
payment. Nevertheless, as we can see from the table, it is true that the
Real had a substantial appreciation in 2008, though it was followed by an
almost equally quick depreciation in the following year that kept the real
exchange rate at a lower level than in many years prior to 2007. There-
fore, as much as Brazilian export associations keep complaining, the ex-
change rate does not seem to be an adequate argument for explaining the
change in the export portfolio discussed in Item 2.3.
Of course, this high volatility affected Brazilian companies, mostly
those that depended on foreign trade. In those cases, businesses that did
not properly have hedge operation set up to protect against exchange rate
exposure faced some difficulties. Indeed, some Brazilian companies like
Sadia, a food tycoon, reported financial difficulties resulting from the ex-
change rate volatility, but actually it was more affected by a financial bet
it took against the dollar than from the impact of the exchange rate on its
21. See BACEN, www.bcb.govbr/pec/indeco/ingi/ie5-28i.xls, supra note 14.
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As is common for situations like this in Brazil, the companies involved
took advantage of the situation to create positive political momentum by
trying to obtain antitrust clearance for a merger with its primary competi-
tor, Perdig~o, which for years was considered monopoly-resulting. 23 The
same pattern can be identified in the Unibanco-Itaii merger, a transaction
involving the third and the fiftieth Brazilian banks that has been negoti-
ated for a long time and posed major antitrust issues. 24 Regretfully, the
ever present National-champion "theory" gained additional power within
the present government, and no political opposition was shown to either
transaction.
In any case, although a volatile exchange rate is a reality, it seems that
the Central Bank's spot interventions have worked well enough to make
the re-adjustment process less traumatic. In addition to that, the same
general decrease in commodities prices that may negatively affect the bal-
ance of payment may, at least partially, prevent or mitigate the apprecia-
tion of the Real. A more competitive exchange rate, in turn, may boost
exports in manufacturing, and that is a general trait of the diversified Bra-
zilian economy. Most changes in the economic environment have posi-
tive and negative effects. Whether or not the exchange rate will favor or
undermine exports remains to be seen.
F. GROWING BUDGET DEFICIT, FALLING TAX REVENUES AND
REDUCTION OF FISCAL SPACE
Fiscal revenues are directly connected with the vigor of economic activ-
ities. As the GDP dropped dramatically in the last quarter of 2008 and in
the first quarter of 2009 (see Table 4), so did tax revenues. The main
sources of revenue loss were identified by the Federal Revenue Secreta-
riat as the reduction in industrial production, companies' turnover and
profit, as well as a decrease in retail sales.25
Nonetheless, the amount of revenue losses cannot be explained wholly
by the economic slowdown since the Brazilian GDP had already recov-
ered at the second quarter of 2009 (see Table 4). Still, revenues continue
to decrease. A complete explanation must go beyond a mere economic
22. "The merger of Perdigdo and Sadia, announced in May, came about after Sadia
took a beating in last year's stock-inarket mayhem. It was hurt when the dollar went
from a weak BRL 1.56 in July 2008 to as high as BRL2.60 in the post-Lehman
Broth ers chaos late last year. Sadia posted the first loss in its 64-year existence and
reported a staggering first-quarter debt, a result of hedging against the U.S. dollar.
Perdigdo essentially become Sadia's white knight. " Kenneth Rapoza, Brazil's New
King of Food, BA RROW'S, July 13, 2009, http://online.barrons.com/article/SB1t24727
518474926343.html.
23. Id.
24. Brazilian merger shuffles Latin American pack, THE BANKER, July 7, 2009, http://
www.thebanker.com/news/fulistory.php/aid/6752.
25. Federal Revenue Collection Analysis-August 2009, Federal Revenue Secretariat of
Brazil, at 2-3, available at www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/Publico/arre/2009/Anal-
isemensalago09.pdf.
2010] 5
66 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16
slowdown. In our view, the significant sustained revenue losses resulted
primarily from the many counter-cyclical measures that the government
implemented in order to fight recession. Many of these measures in-
volved substantial tax breaks for sectors considered strategic to overcom-
ing recession (discretionary tax breaks). These tax breaks largely
benefited the automotive industry, domestic appliances sector, construc-
tion materials, financial transactions, loans, and money exchange .26
In addition to that, the Federal Revenue Secretariat attributes the reve-
nue decrease to other additional factors such as an increase in tax com-
pensation (due to tax offset for overpayment of corporate income tax in
previous years) .2 7 One may also add to these explanations the usual tax
default trend (illegal withholding of taxes by debtors) that usually happen
in Brazil during economic crisis, even though this cannot be measured or
confirmed.
GRAPH 8: FEDERAL REVENUE EVOLUTION
DURING THE CRISIS
(Real Value Y/Y Comparison-IPCA)
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The decline in federal revenues obviously imposes some budgetary re-
strictions for the government if an additional deficit and a negative over-
all effect are to be avoided. Indeed, the fiscal results for the public sector
in 2009 are expected to be worse than 2008 and 2007.28 A recent increase
in the Tax on Financial Transactions (Imposto sabre Operacdes
Financeiras-IOF) levied on foreign investment on the Brazilian financial
26. It is estimated at $17.3 billion. Id. at 2-9.
27. Id. at 3.
28. See Brazil, Sustainable Economy, Brazilian Ministry of Finance/EXAME, n. 3,
Apr. 2008, at 13, 16, available at http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/docs/brasiI-
econom ia-sustentavelI/edicoes/B rasiI- Economia-Suste ntavel -Edicao-4-EN GLIS H.
pdf.
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and capital markets went from zero to two percent in October 2009.29
Although called a regulatory tax, it was said by some to be aimed at re-
ducing fiscal deficit. But we believe that the estimated amount to be col-
lected is not substantial enough to make a difference. Additional
measures to increase tax revenues are expected.
As the counter-cyclical measures wear out and the economy recovers, a
recovering of the government's numbers is expected. In any case, Brazil
has one of the lowest levels of nominal debt compared to countries like
the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, India, Russia, Japan,
France, Italy, Germany, and China,30 and fiscal debt seems to be under
control (see Item 0 below).
G. CONTRACTION OF WORLD TRADE
The crisis clearly decreased world trade. Graph 9 below shows how the
world trade, measured by scale merchandise export, had a massive reduc-
tion from the third quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009.
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The abrupt reduction in the world trade volume as a whole indeed had
some effect on the Brazilian economy. But surprisingly for some the im-
pact was actually very limited. Despite the fact that Brazil is a growing
participant in world trade in recent years, the truth is that the country is
still very closed when compared to other countries. Brazil was responsi-
ble for barely more than one percent of world trade in 2007.32 And this
famished scenario is expected by some to either stabilize or decrease in
29. Foreign Capital in Brazil, at 20, http://www.brasil.org.pl/forms/inv-company-for-
mation in brazil.pdf.
30. See Brazil, Sustainable Economy, supra note 28, at 9.
31. Short-term Merchandise Trade Statistics, World Trade Organization, http:/lwww.
wto.org/english/res-e/statis-e/quarterly-world-exp-ehtm.
32. World Trade Developments, World Trade Organization, 2008, at 3, http://www.wto.
org/english/res-e/statis-e/its2008_e/its08_world-trade-dev-e.pdf.
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the following years.33 When it comes to commercial services, the Brazil-
ian share is even smaller .3 4 In a country so closed to international trade it
is not difficult to see why the sudden drop in world trade volume had very
limited economical impact.
To make the world trade downfall even less relevant to Brazil, it is
important to remember that our export portfolio is highly spread around
the globe. The crisis is somewhat concentrated in the United States and
in some European countries, but these countries represent only about
fifty percent of Brazilian foreign customers .3 5 The rest of our production
is shipped to Latin America, Africa, Asia and other countries.36 In 2007,
Brazil exported US$32 billion to North America, US$38 billion to South
and Central America, US $43 billion to Europe, US$9 billion to Africa,
US$6 billion to the Middle East, US$4 billion to CIS, and US$26 billion
to Asia.37 This diversification eased some of the impact of the trade re-
traction and clearly worked as a positive factor to partially insulate the
Brazilian economy from the crisis.
H. INCREASED VOLATILITY AND FALLING PRICES
FOR PRIMARY COMMODITIES
According to the IMF report on the implications of the global financial
crisis for low-income countries, particularly in Latin America, Africa, and
the Middle East, commodity exporting countries would have to deal with
a "sharp decline in commodity prices."138 Also, in Latin America growth
is expected to be restricted by a decrease in external demand (notably
from the United States), and financial conditions are "expected to slow
from [4.5%] in 2008 to [1%] in 2009.1139 The IMF Report also states that
"food prices are likely to be less affected by the" crisis because "food
demand is less income-elastic than other commodities."54 0
On one hand, since 1978 Brazil has exported more manufactured prod-
ucts than commodities, and this may indicate that the decrease in the
commodities price level may have an adverse impact on Brazil, but again
of limited intensity .4 '1 Furthermore, the second item in the commodities
export portfolio is food, which may help alleviate the impact of price de-
generation. On the other hand, as discussed above, the demand reduc-
33. Ernst & Young, Brasil Sustertdvel: Horizontes da competitividade industrial (2009),
available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/BrasilSustentavel__
H-orizontes-da-competitividade-industrial/$FI LE/Brasil-Sustentavel-_Competi-
tividadejind ustria l.pd f.
34. WTO, World Trade Developments, sutpra note 32, at 15.
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Int'l Monetary Fund, The Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for Low In-
come Countries, at 3 (2009). available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/res-e/statis-e/
its2008_e/its08_world-trade-dev-e.pdf.
39. Id.
40. Id. a t 4.
41. See Remburssi. Gateway to Brazil, h ttp://www. remburssi.org/projects/brazil/Part-
ll.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
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tion for manufactured products was substantial enough to tip the export
portfolio in favor of commodities for the first time in more than thirty
years .4 2
The portfolio modification is considered by the export sector and the
government as a potential problem, and some counteracting measures are
being considered. Nonetheless, we believe that this temporary portfolio
modification is much more related to the fact that consumers of manufac-
tured products (United States and the Americas) were more affected by
the crisis than commodities consumers (China and Asia). As a result, it is
unclear whether governmental measures would be effective.
1. DECLINING; REMITTANCES To DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
As with any developing country, Brazil is expected to receive less port-
folio investment as the world gets more restrictive. However, this general
trend has been highly mitigated or even blocked by the fact that Brazil
was upgraded to investment grade by the three major rating companies in
2008 and 2009, despite the crisis and as a result of the quick economic
recovery during the recession .4 3 This perception was clearly reflected in
Bovespa's impressive recovery, as we can see from Table 6 above. 44 As a
result, even if the portfolio investment in Brazil decreased, foreign direct
investment was more than sufficient to sustain the balance of payments .45
J. SHARPLY REDUCED REVENUES FROM TOURISM
Once more, although the phenomenon was somewhat felt, its relevance
is much more minimal than expected for the Brazilian economy. A sharp
decline in revenues from the tourism sector is expected due to the high
income-elasticity of tourism-related activities, which applies to leisure in
general. Even if that becomes the case, the tourism share in Brazilian
GDP is restricted to 3.6 %.46 Beyond the limited relevance of tourism for
the Brazilian economy, a large part of tourism activity is composed of
42. IBGE, supra note 13.
43. Lisa Schineller & Sebastian Briozzo, Research Update: Brazil Long- Term Foreign
Currency Rating Raised To Investment-Grade 'BBB-', Outlook Stable, S-rANDARD
& POOR's RATINGS DIREc-r, Apr. 30, 2008, at 2.
44. Yahoo Finance, IBOVESPA -(B VSP), http.//lfinance.yahoo.conm/echarts?s-%5
EB VSP#chart2.:symbo/=A bvsp;range=20041109,200911 10;-indicator voluime,-chart
type line,-crosshair=on;ohlcvaluies=0;logscale-on (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
45. Accordingly to the OECD Report: "Its [balance of payments] continues to be fi-
nanced comfortably by robust FDI inflows, which more than offset the decline in
portfolio investment as the global financial environment weakened in the second
half of 2008. As a result of a positive balance of payments position, international
reserves continued to be accumulated until late in 2008, when the central bank
launched a number of liquidity enhancing measures and intervened sporadically in
the foreign exchange market...International reserves stood at close to USD 200
billion in May 2009 (about 13% of GDP)." OECD, supra note 18, at 24.
46. See Pedro Soares. Turismo representa s6 3.6% do PIB, Folha de Sdo Paulo,
DINH ElRO, June 4, 2009, http://imprensa.spturis.com/imprensa/clipping/files/090
604/3.pdf.
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internal tourism that was not highly affected by the crisis because income
was not severely effect, as discussed in Item 0 above.
In addition, while income shortage in developed countries may have
reduced the inflow of international tourists, Real's temporary deprecia-
tion may have mitigated this effect for a while. It also reinforced
Brazilians' tendency to travel within the country. Summing up, the de-
crease in tourism resulting from the crisis may adversely affect Brazil, but
the impact is expected to be small with very few repercussions on the
economy as a whole.
K. MASSIVE REVERSAL OF PRIVATE CAPITAL INFLOWS
Please refer to Items above.
L. REDUCED ACCESS TO CREDIT AND TRADE FINANCING
Thbis was the most evident outcome of the crisis and was triggered by
unsafe credit practices, which were finally proven to be more than a
credit bubble. It would also affect the Brazilian credit market, even
though the Brazilian banking system is not too "internationalized". The
Brazilian Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance adopted appropriate
measures (see comments on this issue in section 3) that have been enough
to substantially mitigate the effects of the crisis so far. 47
M. REDUCED PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Wherever it was felt, the reduced confidence in financial institutions
was a phenomenon intrinsically attached to the crisis. Because some fi-
nancial institutions went bankrupt abroad and many others threatened to
fall, a feeling of insecurity spread throughout the population of many
countries where those banks transacted more heavily. This was not the
case for Brazil.
The Brazilian banking sector is much more concentrated than in most
developed countries. Additionally, an environment of hyperinflation,
constant change of currency, and financial rules combined with many in-
ternational crises forged one of the most flexible and technologically so-
phisticated banking systems in the world. The system is still largely
47. The OECD Report states: "The central bank took decisive action to enhance liquid-
ity in the domestic money market by reducing compulsory reserve requirements for
banks, which have traditionally been tight, by some 3.5% of GDP during Septem-
ber- December 2008. The authorities also created incentives for larger financial insti-
tutions to purchase the loan portfolios of smaller banks, which were affected
particularly adversely by the deteriorating credit environment. As in previous peri-
ods of financial distress, interventions in foreign-exchange markets were carried out
in a transparent manner; they were aimed at ensuring liquidity in periods of thin
trade and geared towards smoothing excessive volatility in the exchange rate. The
relaxation of the monetary stance as from January 2009 has been appropriate; it has
brought real ex ante interest rates to historically low levels. There may well be
room for some fuirther monetary easing in the near term, depending on the strength
of the recovery and the evolution of inflation expectations over the coming months."
See OECD, supra note 18, at 9-10 (emphasis in original)
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centered on national capital, either private or public, with little activity
abroad. Most international banks entered the market through mergers
and acquisitions and their importance is growing steadily, though they are
still responsible for only around twenty-five percent of lending and hold
only twenty percent of the deposits.4 8
The fact that the Brazilian banking system is one of the most regulated
in the world, combined with a local focus explains in a larger measure
why the financial crisis did not hit Brazil so hard in the financial sector.
As a general rule, the local banks were much less exposed to risks than
their North-American and European counterparts (better Basle index
than the standard recommendation 4 9 ) , and almost none took part in the
derivatives festival. Obviously some confidence disturbances were felt
and some deposit transfers from private to public banks happened (there
is a general belief that public banks and financial institutions are less
likely to go bankrupt), but general confidence was not really shaken.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Brazilian financial sector was healthy
and almost free of toxic assets, some banks used the threatening environ-
ment to conduct mergers that would normally raise antitrust concerns
(e.g. ItailUnibanco merger), and the Government created strong incen-
tives for the larger banks to buy the portfolios of medium or small banks,
furthering the historical trend for concentration, including in the credit
market. In any case, to close the argument, it is enough to say that Brazil-
ian banks closed 2008 with large profits, only 2.8% lower than in 2007 and
behind only Petrobras .5 0 Therefore, we may say that confidence in the
financial institutions is not an issue in Brazil right now.
N. REDUCED ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SOCIAL SAFETY NETS AND
PROVIDE OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES, SUCH AS
HEALTH AND EDUCATION
As we have shown, public finances were adversely affected by the cri-
sis, and the revenue losses clearly will impose some budgetary constraints
48. Since the debacle of hyperinflation, Brazil has faced an aggressive concentration
process in the banking system. In the last eleven years, the number of operating
banks dropped 32.2%. For the sake of illustration, in 2007, Brazil had only 156
banking enterprises, while Germany registered 2,130 and the United States 7,282.
Ministro Guido, Mantega, Atravessando, a Crise Mundial Conselho Politico [Presen-
tation Before the Political Council of the Republic: A Way Through the Global
Crisis] (Feb. 18. 2009), available at www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/documentos/
2009/p180209-conselho-politico.pdf.
49. The Basle index indicates bank assets risk exposure. Average Brazilian bank sector
Basle index is 6.5% while Basle recommendation is 8%. See Ministro Guido
Mantega, Atravessando a Crise Mundial Conselho Politico [Presentation Before
the Political Council of the Republic: A Way Through the Global Crisis] (Feb. 18,
2009), www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/documentos/2009/pl80209-conselho-
politico.pdf. [hereinafter Guido Mantega].
50. See Estado, Petrobras tira bancos do topo dos lucros em 2008, Mar. 4, 2009, http://
www.new.divirtase.uai.com.br/html/sessao_28/2009/04/03/ficha-ciclopalestrasid-
sessao=28&id -noticia-9560/ficha ciclopalestras.shtml; see also Especial Lucro dos
Bancos, http://www.feebpr.org.br/Iucroban.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
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on the Brazilian Government. But as discussed, the Brazilian economy is
already reacting, and we are no longer in a recession. Now, most of the
revenue losses are attributable to counter-cyclical measures that probably
will no longer be in place in 2010 (see Item 0 below).
On the top of that, the Brazilian social security net is very extensive
and to a large extent imposed by the Constitution with earmarked contri-
butions (in lieu of "taxes"), which fund the system encompassing public
health and education systems. This straitjacket policy largely refrains
from any conjuncture temptation to reduce social expenditures and, with
the reemerging economy, funding will be available again. In sum, the
decrease in public revenues was not sufficient to cause any serious dam-
age to social safety nets.
0. INCREASED INFANT AND MATERNAL MORTALITY
The expected increase in infant and maternal mortality is also linked to
the expected scarcity of public resources to fund social programs aimed at
reducing these events. As explained above, to our knowledge, there was
no substantial budget cut in any program associated with such mortality
and because revenues are likely to return in 2010, no future cut is foresee-
able. In fact, the rates for infant and maternal mortality in Brazil have
been declining steadily in recent years and will probably not reverse its
trend due to the crisis.5 ' For illustrative purposes, Graph 10 below shows
the continuous decrease in infant mortality from 1990 to 2008:
GRAPH 10: INFANT MORTALITY IN BRAZIL
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51. Index Mundi, Brazil Infant Mortality Rate, http://www.indexmundi.com/brazil/in-
fant-mortality-rate.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2009); MDG MONITOR, Tracking
the Milleniumn Dev. Goals, http://www.mdgmonitor.org/factsheets_00.cfm?c=B RA
(last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
52. Instittuto Brasileiro de Geografla e Estatista, Taxas de Mortalidade Infantil 1990-
2008, http://www.ibge.gov.br~brasil-em-sintese/populacao09.h tm (last visited Nov.
tO, 2009).
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P. COLLAPSE OF HOUSING MARKETS
Because the crisis originated in the sub-prime market and was inter-
connected with the housing bubble in the United States, it was reasonable
to expect that the crisis would adversely affect the housing market else-
where. But this expectation does not apply to Brazil. The housing mar-
ket did not become dismal primarily because there was no such bubble
locally. The banks were not involved either directly or indirectly in the
financial festival of the derivatives. In addition, Brazil still has a large
habitation deficit that will take years to be reduced substantially. This
deficit puts considerable pressure on the demand side and prevents price
level decreases.
In any case, because the crisis affected the economy as a whole, some
effects were felt by the construction sector in general-including the
housing sector, which grew substantially in the previous years and gener-
ated jobs. Aware of this negative impact, the government quickly put in
place big stimulus packages for construction companies to finance their
activities and gave discretionary tax breaks for inputs. Additionally,
these public financial institutions rapidly expanded their lines of credits
to compensate the growing risk aversion in the market, mainly for the
housing sector to maintain and create demand for this strategic sector
(see Item 0 below). All of this combined with the lowest interest rates in
decades was sufficient to prevent a substantial deterioration of the hous-
ing market in Brazil that remains sound and growing.
As we can see, in many aspects, the anticipated impact of the crisis was
either non-existent or much more limited in Brazil than in other coun-
tries. This was in some ways due to historical limitations that now offered
strategic advantages, and in some ways due to sound political reforms
that took place prior to the crisis, such as the restructuring of the public
debt profile and the raising of foreign reserves. Notwithstanding, the
government actively took some measures to reduce the impact of the cri-
sis, as Brazil is not isolated from the rest of the world. We discuss some
of them in the next section.
111. BRAZILIAN RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS
As we have discussed, the Brazilian economy was very resilient in
showing the effects of the financial crisis. 53 Even when the crisis was al-
ready affecting many strong economies around the globe, in July 2008
Brazil was still considered to be "prospering in terms of economic
growth, running sound public economic policies, with strong macro eco-
nomical fundamentals, and enjoying growing international confidence."154
53. See Mauricio Cardenas, Global Financial Crisis: Is Brazil a Bystander?, The
Brookings Inst., Oct. 15, 2008, www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/1015_financial_
crisis-cardenas.aspx.
54. Valadao & Porto, supra note 4, at 674; see also Jonathan Wheatley & Richard Lap-
per, Surfing a Big Wave of Confidence, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2008, http://www.ft.com/
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Regretfully, it did not last forever. After the second quarter of 2008, the
crisis aggravated and started to show its ugly claws to the country. This
time, though, Brazil was wearing more than just studded leather armor-
it was wearing a full metal plate.
It is worth stressing some aspects of the Brazilian economic armoring:
huge and still growing international reserves of more than US$223 billion,
an "investment growth rate [that] is higher than aggregate demand
growth, [a] bank sector with better Basle index than the Basle recommen-
dation' 5 5 and [controlled and decreasing] public debt."15 6
At first, all theses gleaming figures were not sufficient to insulate Brazil
(it looks like even full plates have holes). Indeed, the rate of economic
growth dropped vertiginously in the last quarter of 2008 and remained so
in the following quarter .5 7 Nevertheless, by the second quarter of 2009,
growth resumed its pace (GDP was 1.9% higher than the previous quar-
ter). 58 It certainly does not necessarily mean that the crisis is over for
Brazil, but it is strong evidence that the Brazilian locomotive is getting
back on track again.
It is important to note that the Brazilian Government adopted many
measures and that there is no single place or official document where we
can find all of them duly identified and explained. Overall, they seem to
have worked very well, but as scholars, we are left with a bitter taste
because we cannot really identify all of them and scrutinize them to learn
for the future.
In any case, in the previous sections we mentioned some of the adopted
measures and we would like to further discuss them here. The ECLAC
report depicts that most of the measures implemented were organized
into five major fields of action: monetary and financial policy, exchange-
rate and foreign-trade policy, sectoral policies, labor and social policies,"
and fiscal policy. 59
A. MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
The crisis, deepening in October 2008, threatened developing countries
with a substantial retraction of capital flows and foreign investment,
which was expected to adversely affect the exchange rate and external
accounts. The resulting increase in risk aversion increased volatility and,
as a result, reduced liquidity. In order to alleviate this problem, the gov-
ernment tried to partially compensate the reduction in foreign capital
with public funds. In addition, since the banking legal reserve in Brazil is
cms/s/0/3eb2654a-4a45-1 I dd-891a-000077b07658,dwp uuid-1 b5d8778-472f-1 1ldd-
93ca-000077b0765 8. htImI? nclick check =1.
55. Valadao & Porto, supra note 4, at 674-675; see also Mantega, supra note 49.
56. Id. at 674-675.
57. See Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia y Estatista, Contas Nacionias Trimestrais,
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/indicadores/pib/pib-vol-val20090210.
shim (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
58. See id. for more details.
59. ECLAC, supra note 7, at 5.
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very conservative when compared to world standards, liquidity could be
easily created as the Central Bank saw fit just by relaxing the restrictions,
and basically that is what was done.60
In September 2008, four days after Lehman Brothers went down, credit
was scarce and the Real faced a sudden depreciation in front of the Dol-
lar. The Central Bank had to inject half a billion dollars on the table to
calm down the market. The lack of foreign credit was perceived as affect-
ing medium and small banks that faced difficulties finding financial capi-
tal. Foreseeing the potential necessity of a quick intervention, the
Central Bank's "powers to intervene in failing financial institutions" were
substantially broadened. 6' The two major federal financial institutions,
Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econ~mica Federal, were also "authorized to
buy struggling financial institutions, as well as insurance . .. enterprises"
and social security enterprises without having to follow the public pro-
curement law.62
The creation of an investment bank within the Caixa Econdmica Fed-
eral (CAIXA-Banco de Investimentos S.A.) to buy the stock of real es-
tate firms in trouble as well as other sectors was announced .6 3 This bank
would start with about a billion dollars of capital to invest, and this allow-
ance would be valid until June 30, 201,1.64 These investments were meant
to substitute IPOs or issue shares as a capitalization mechanism. The
Central Bank was authorized to grant loans secured by loan portfolios to
banks and other forms of financing were offered, including loans to com-
panies to facilitate the refinancing of their external debts ("allocating up
to US$20 billion of the country's reserves") .6 5 Around 4,000 enterprises
were expected to benefit from these measures. 66 Most measures were
authorized by Provisory Measure n 443/2008 (Oct 2008), which was con-
verted into law in March 2009.67
"On [January 21st], 2009, the central bank cut its basic interest rate by
60. The following measures were listed in an official publication (Brazil, Sustainable
Economy, supra note 28. at 23) as measures adopted to assist the financial sector:
INTER-BANKING MARKETI: Reduce compulsory deposit and speed up rediscount op-
erations, injecting US$45.5 billion into the economy: STIMULUS FOR MARKET SO-
LUTION: (i) Reduction of the bank compulsory deposit conditioned to the
acquisition of loan portfolios; (ii) Authorization for BB and CEF to be sharehold-
ers in financial institutions (MP 443); (iii) Creation of the company Caixa- Banco
de lnvestimento.(investment bank); (iv) Support to small and medium banks with
extension of guarantees from US$27 thousand to US$9 million in CDBIRDB. See
Brazil, Sustainable Economy, supra note 28, at 23.
61. Valadlao & Porto, supra note 4, at 675.




65. ECLAC, supra note 7, at 12.
66. Id.
67. Although Brazil is a Presidential country, the Constitution allows the President to
issue law-like decrees in cases of urgency and relevance that are immediately legally
enforceable. These decrees, called Provisional Measures, must be submitted hitherto
to Congress for referral. The measures mentioned above were largely regulated by
Medida Provis6ria n 443, October 2 1st, 2008 (Brazil). This PM was transformed
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100 basis points (from 13.75% to 12.75 %)."168 The decrease continued
until the lowest historical level was reached on September 2009 at 8.75%.
Although the market is already foreseeing some interest rate increases in
2010, this reduction has substantially helped mitigate the effects of the
crisis and could signal a new low-level trend in interest rates for Brazil.
Many measures were taken during the previous months as the crisis
developed. It is not our purpose here to list all of them, but the ones
mentioned above represent how the crisis was fought in the financial
sector.
B. EXCHANGE-RATE AND FOREIGN-TRADE POLICY
The lack of liquidity represented some difficulties to Brazilian export-
ers that needed to carry out transactions in the United States dollar. To
mitigate this concern, foreign exchange (Forex) reserves were used to fi-
nance exports through "reverse auction of bank securities to backstop
foreign trade."169 The contracts tie in to the repurchase of these instru-
ments, thus maintaining the foreign reserves levels. Indeed, even after
the crisis started affecting Brazil, the level of foreign reserves had been
steadily increasing and had reached its historical level of $225 billion by
October 6.70 The Central Bank was also "allowed to grant foreign-cur-
rency loans directly to private banks, exclusively to finance foreign trade
transactions.17 1
The Brazilian export sector, specifically the agricultural industrial sec-
tor, was facing financial problems due to financial leveraging through de-
rivative instruments attached to Dollar and Real exchange rate (the
exchange rate in July 2008 was roughly 1/1.6 and turned to 1/2.3 in Dec.
2008).72 Although the exchange rate is already returning to the pre-crisis
levels, many exporters are still facing some difficulties in dealing with the
natural volatility and gaining access to financial instrument required to
effectively export. Some of these measures are being taken to mitigate
theses difficulties while markets return to normal activity level.
into law by the National Congress: Lei No. 11.908, de 3 de Marco de 2009, available
at http://www.jusbrasil.com.br/legislacao/92233/lei-I 1908-09.
68. ECLAC, supra note 7, at 12.
69. ECLAC, supra note 7, at 11.
70. Banco Central do Brasil, Reservas Internacionais, http://1www4.bcb.gov. br/?RP2009
1006 (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
71. ECLAC, supra note 7, at i1.
72. Efforts to Face the Crisis, SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY (Ministry of Fin., Brazil), Apr.
2009, at 23 http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/docs/brasiI-economia-sustentaveI/
edicoes/Brasil-Economia-Sustentavel-Edicao-4 ENG LISH.pdf. (The following
measures were listed as measures adopted to assist exporters: "Exchange Market
and Export: Dollar auction in currency and in the future market (swaps). Dollar
auction directed to the financing of Pre-shipment export financing (ACCs). Invest-
ment of part of the international reserves in the expansion of financing sources of
Brazilian companies abroad.").
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C. SECTrORAL POLICIES
In the oil and gas sector, the borrowing capacity of Petrobras and the
National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) was ex-
panded to around US$5.3 billion "to keep up planned investment
levels."173
In the agriculture sector, US$6.5 billion was allocated to specific
policies:74
US$2.2 billion as advances of resources from Banco do Brasil.
US$2.4 billion increase in resources that banks must earmark the ag-
ricultural sector. Increase in rate for compulsory rural savings de-
posits from sixty-five to seventy percent, which represents US$1.1
billion. Use of Forex reserves to finance the rural sector through the
intermediary of trading companies. Use of US$200 million in re-
sources from constitutional funds. US$400 million in assistance for
agricultural cooperatives. [and] allocation of US$150 million to fam-
ily agriculture using resources from the Workers' Protection Fund
(FAT). 75,76
For the automobile sector, US$1.8 billion from Banco do Brasil was
made available to manufacturing banks for financing sales; motorcycle
sales were boosted with fiscal incentives through discretionary tax breaks
on financing (101F reduction), acquisition (PIS/COFINS reduction), and
ownership costs (decrease in the IPVA) of motorbikes. 77 In addition, a
credit line of US$182 million (US$91 million from FAT and US$91 mil-
lion from Banco do Brasil) was opened to finance "working capital of
used car dealers, upon guarantee of employment [level] maintenance."178
For the auto parts dealers and manufacturers, a credit line of US$1.4 bil-
lion was also made available to finance working capital.79
Regarding the housing market, one of the main instruments used by
the Government was the traditional company, Caixa Econdmica Federal.
It created a credit line for working capital of US$1.4 billion and simplified
the collateral requirements for lending and increased the amount limits
for the acquisition of building material (from US$3.2 thousand to
73. ECLAC, supra note 7, at 11.
74. Id.
75. The Workers' Protection Fund (FAT) is a public fund composed of taxres (social
contributions) mainly aimed at paying worker benefits of the unemployed.
76. Efforts to Face the Crisis, supra note 72 (The following measures were listed as
measures adopted to assist exporters: "Agribusiness Financing: Anticipation of
BB [Bank of Brazil] disbursements [for agricultural loans]. Additional resources
for various funds (US$ 2.3 bi). Increase in directed credit with compulsory. A
US$ 227 million line for Center-Western producers. Expansion of the PGPAF
(Price Guarantee for Family Agriculture Program) for the investment operations
beginning on the 2008/2009 harvests. Creation of the LEG (Special Commerciali-
zation Line) during the 2008/2009 harvests. Extension of term for renegotiation of
rural debts (after Law 11.775/2008).").
77. Id. (10F is a federal tax on loan transactions. IPVA is a state tax on property of
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US$11.4 thousand). 80 In addition, the Government changed regulations
to allow up to five percent of the savings deposits to be invested in work-
ing capital operations for housing; reinforced real estate financing for the
Federal Government employees by creating a credit line of US$1.8 billion
for Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econ6mica Federal; created a new housing
program with subsidies directly from the Treasury in the amount of
US$7.3 billion; changed regulation to allow the use of workers resources
at the FGTS to acquire housing that represented US$1.1 billion from the
Treasury and US$3.4 billion from the FGTS itself;81 created a credit line
of US$2.3 billion from the Treasury to finance infrastructure; created a
credit line of US$0.9 billion from the Federal Union Grantor's Fund; cre-
ated a credit line of US$0.5 billion from BNDES to finance productive
enterprises; and, finally, reduced the federal tax on manufactured prod-
ucts (IPI) on construction materials.82
D. LABOR AND SOCIAL POLICES
The current government has been steadily increasing the real value of
the legal minimum wage in the last years as an income redistribution
strategy. Within this context, a twelve percent increase of the minimum
wage was planned-before the crisis-to take place in 2009; it would in-
crease the minimum wage to US$211, 83 and the wages in the health and
education of public servants were expected to rise by fourteen percent. 84
These wage increases were maintained, although interrupting them was
seriously considered. As previously discussed, the expenditure levels in
social programs like Bolsa Famflia 85 and investments within the Growth
Acceleration Program (PAC) continue largely unaltered.86 With all the
other measures and the quick recovery of the economy, no additional
social measures were required nor implemented.
80. Id.
81. The Time of Service Guarantee Fund (FGTS) is a fund created with compulsory
contributions from each worker in the private sector that is used by the Government
to finance civil construction. The employee was previously allowed to withdraw his
or her resources from FGTS only in specific cases, but mainly when the employer
terminated the worker's labor contract.
82. See Brazil, Sustainable Economy, supra note 28, at 23.
83. Id.
84. ECLAC, supra note 7, at 11.
85. See generally Anthony Hall, From Fome Zero to Bolsa Familiai: Social Policies and
Poverty Alleviation uinder Lida, 38 J. LA-r. Am. STUDIEs 689 (2006) (discussing the
Bolsa Familia program).
86. See e.g.. Marcos Valadao & Nara Porto Galeb. Brazilian Response to International
Financial Crisis, the Pre-Salt Discoveries by Petrobras and the New Free Trade Ar-
eas in the Cities of Brazil, 13 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 715, 717-719 (2007) (discussing
the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC); Governo Federal, Programa de
Aceleracao de Crescimento 2007-2010, at 5 (2007), available at www.fazenda.gov.
br/port ugues/re Ieases/2007/r220 107- PAC- in tegra. pd f.
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E. FISCAL POLICY
In order to amplify the leeway for governmental policies to mitigate
the effects of the crisis, a "reduction in [the] primary surplus target for
2009 from 4.3% to 3.8% of GDP" was initially considered .8 7 But because
the fiscal results were much worse than expected, the primary surplus
target for 2009 was reduced to 2.5% and could be reduced further to
1.56% of the GDP.88 Obviously this is not very positive news, but be-
cause Brazilian public debt grew very little during the crisis, it went from
41.8% of the GDP in August 2008 to 44% in August 2009. This is proba-
bly the lowest increase in the world, and the target for 2010 is 3.3% (al-
though it may be reduced to something between 2% and 2.2%) The
Brazilian position is much more comfortable than the position of many of
its trading partners.89
Although we would all like to see the target go up again, as a sound
fiscal policy, the time for saving is not right now. The freed resources can
be used to fuel anti-cyclical policies and to increase overall expenditure,
and that is what the government has been doing. These resources have
been used:
(i) to inject over "US$43.8 billion in the economy to keep up con-
sumption levels;"
(ii) to guarantee that Ministries are able to "bring forward spend-
ing and [to] ensure a parallel budget of at least US$11.4
billion;"
(iii) to make possible "fresh tax cuts and more resources" to the
sectors more vulnerable;
(iv) to protect $9.2 billion already "earmarked for the Growth Ac-
celeration Programme (PAC) in the 2009 budget;"
(v) on projects, to "maintain overall demand" with resources from
the Sovereign Fund ($6.3 billion);
(vi) by "federal State enterprises to release at least US$17.5 billion
in investment" in providing "inputs and raw materials" for the
industry; and
(vii) to finance "an advertising campaign to stimulate
consumption. "90
From the revenues perspective, the "Federal government and some
state [governments] have extended the time allowed for monthly tax pay-
ments, thus easing pressure on corporate cash flows." 91 On top of that, as
already discussed:
a series of tax cuts have been announced, totaling around US$3.7
billion, in order to boost consumption:
87. ECLAC, supra note 7, at 10.




90. ECLAC, supra note 7, at 10-12.
91. Id. at 12.
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(i) the tax on financial operations will be cut from 3% to 1.5% for
direct consumer credit operations and the overdraft credit line;
(ii) the tax on processed products was temporarily cut, until March
2009; for the purchase of motor vehicles with cylinder capaci-
ties of up to 1,000 cc., the tax will be cut from 7% to 0%, and
for those up to 2,000 cc., from 13% to 6.5%; and
(i1i) the income tax tables for physical persons were revised 92 [ef-
fectively] creating lower rates (7.55% and 22.5%) that favour
the middle class, that is, those who earn up to US$875 per
month.93
Finally, regarding taxes, some other measures were adopted in addition
to the postponement of tax payments, acceleration in credit return proce-
dures, and a 1.5% 101F reduction for foreign capital in fixed rate funds
and bonds .94
The government implemented all of the above mentioned measures to
foster production and consumption and to mitigate the effects of the cri-
sis. The measures were very successful in sustaining economic activities,
although their impact on revenues is still very present and may present an
issue if growth does not turn to revenues in the near future.
F. INVESTMENT AND PRODUCTION FINANCING
With respect to investment and production financing, the main mea-
sures were:
(i) "maintenance of the TJLP [Long Term Interest Rate] on
6.25% p.y." which is low for Brazilian standards;
(ii) capitalization of the BNDES (in US$45.5 billion) and transfer-
ence of a line of credit of US$2.3 billion from the World Bank;
(iii) creation of a line of credit of more than US$2.7 billion for
"working capital, pre-shipping export and swing loans;" (iv)
making ready to use of more than US$4.5 billion of the
Merchant Marine Fund;
92. The tax rates changes are depicted below:
Income tax rates- Individuals-A n nual basis
Taxable Income brackets (US $) Current tax rate New tax rates
Not over $7,825.03 Exemption Exemption
Over $7,825.03, but not over $11,727.27 15% 7.5%
Over R$11,727.27 but not over R$15,636. 15% 15%
Over R$15,636.54 but not over R$19,538.18 27.5% 22.5%
Over R$ 19,538.18 27.5% 27.5%
Note that there were only two tax rates before the change. It entered into force in
Jan. 1st, 2009. Medida Provis6ria n 451, de 15 de dezembro de 2008, D.O de
16.12.2008, art. t5 (Assumed exchange rate US$ 1.00 x R$ 2.2) (Brazil).
93. ECLAC, supra note 7, at 10-12.
94. See Brazil, Sustainable Economy, Brazilian Ministry of Finance/EXAME, n. 5 Oct.
2009. at 3, 15-16, available at http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/docs/brasiI-
economia-sustentavel/edicoes/Brasil-Economia-Sustentavel-Edicao-5_ENGLISH.
pd f.
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(v) "[Second] Phase of the Revitalize Program" involving US$1.8
billion for special financing credit lines for working capital, in-
vestments, exports (pre-shipping) that normally benefits shoes,
leather, textile, cloths and furniture companies; 95
(vi) "increase in Petrobras' investment program"; and
(vii) "continuity in the expansion of investments in infrastructure
(PAC: additional $64.6 billion in 2010)."9
In the area of government investment, an increase of US$4.2 billion in
expenditures was established, "adding to the US$16.6 billion already
planned."197 The creation of a sovereign fund with an "initial amount of
0.5% of GDP (around US$5 billion)" was agreed upon.981 The govern-
ment is aiming to use these funds to "provide the country with savings to
compensate fur any future economic fluctuations and finance the interna-
tionalization of Brazilian companies" through issuance of Treasury
bonds.99 The Unemployment Insurance Fund, FGTS, has also planned to
release up to US$2.5 billion for infrastructure investments.' 00
IV. FINAL COMMENTS
We begin our final remarks by quickly comparing Brazil to the source
of the financial crisis, the United States. While in the United States' mea-
sures to face the crisis included restrictions on home loans to make them
more secure to credit companies, in Brazil measures were adopted to
make them easier. While in the United States concerns with inflation
were put aside due to the urgency to push the economy out of recession,
in Brazil the Central Bank was controlling the interest rates but with fo-
cus on the inflation rate, although the interest rate dropped substantially
to help the country mitigate the crisis effects.
In Brazil the governmental financial enterprises are responsible for a
large share of the banking activities (Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econ~mica
Federal, BNDES, and other public banks) that grant some additional lee-
way for governmental actions. This tool was not available to our Ameri-
can counterparts. Furthermore, the banking sector is highly
concentrated, and banking activities are heavily regulated by the Central
Bank, making them less exposed to risk. These features are not encoun-
tered in the United States. The financial systems are strikingly different,
and the perception of the banking system is different. Indeed, there is no
need for the bank systems to be equal, or even similar; in other words,
95. See generally Programna Revitaliza, Ministerlo Do Desenvolvimnento, Industria e
Comercio Exterior. www.mdic.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php'?area=2&menu=941I
(last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
96. Efforts to Face the Crisis, supra note 72, at 12.
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"there is no one-size-fits-all financial system."' 0 ' Different institutional
arrangements within diffqrent institutional contexts lead to different re-
sults. Though all of this is true, it is also clear now that even with differ-
ent institutional arrangements, world stabilization requires coordination.
The United States is where the "serpent's egg" blossomed, but it is un-
deniable that the effects of the crisis have spread to all countries, includ-
ing Brazil. Some were more affected, while some were less affected. The
crisis became global. The circumstances for each country are different,
and so were the remedies to tackle it. Brazil has done its homework and
has constructed a financial system that is stronger now than before the
crisis. It remains to be seen if the developed countries will take the op-
portunity to face their entrenched interests and construct a better inter-
national financial order. This may require restructuring the role and the
effectiveness of the international financial institutions, especially the IMF
and World Bank Group, and may require creating a formal international
law-based institution that deals with the domestic and international regu-
lation of the financial sector to replace the current Basle Committee and
enforce universal accounting standards. Tax transparency, information
exchange, and capital flow controls are also fields of high interest to
maintain a system of effective surveillance of the international financial
sector. 102
As can be seen from recent events, Brazil was rewarded for being
highly responsible in its public policies and in regulating its financial sys-
tem. Whether the country will actually be able to enjoy a windfall of
public income in the near future-due to pre-salt oil resources that were
meant to foster its development process, is yet to be seen.' 03
Considering all the circumstances, the fact is that the whole world
would benefit greatly if the lessons of the past could be learned and ex-
ploited to create a better international financial order. Brazil has been
doing its part. The future will show how well the lessons of the past have
been learned.
101. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, N.Y. & Geneva, 2009,
Financial Regulation: Fighting Today's Crisis Today, 37, available at http://www.
unctad.org/en/docs/gds2009l-.en.pdf.
102. See G20 Pittsburgh Summit, Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept.
24-25, 2009) available at http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.
htm (these three fields of action: regulation of international financial system (pru-
dential banking regulation), with significant role to the new Financial Stability
Board (FBS); tax transparency (by restructuring the role of the Global Forum on
Transparency on Exchange of information for Tax Purposes). and the control of
capital flows (recognizing the role of the FATF/GAFI), has been continuously
highlighted by the G20 as fundamentals to deal with and to prevent such crisis.
Nevertheless, other strategies to help poorer countries achieve a more efficient
global development architecture should also be adopted).
103. See Valadao & Porto, supra note 4, at 679-80.
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